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ABSTRACT 
 
There is currently a wave of high speed rail proposals sweeping through Europe, amounting to some 
7000 route kilometres of new construction and 8000 of upgraded track and costing of the order of 58 
billion ecu (in 1985 prices). There is therefore an urgent need for a careful assessment of the costs and 
benefits, both of the network as a whole and of the individual component parts of it. 
 
The principal benefits of high speed rail are taken to be the revenue, traffic and time savings it generates; 
relief of congestion , accidents and environmental effects of other modes of transport  and its alleged 
local and regional development benefits. Clearly many of these benefits depend on how far it really does 
divert traffic from these modes as opposed to generating totally new trips. At the same time, high speed 
rail schemes have significant environmental costs. 
 
Evidence on all of these issues is examined, and it is concluded that the evidence for environmental and 
development benefits is limited, although in the former case in particular much depends on the exact 
circumstances. Given the wide variety of options in terms of speeds and mix of upgrading versus new 
construction, careful appraisal is very important, and a traditional transport cost-benefit analysis and 
environmental impact assessment appear well equipped to capture the main costs and benefits.  
 
The conclusion is that there is likely to be a good case for a core network linking the major cities of 
Western Europe in the middle distance range, but beyond that, upgrading of existing infrastructure and 
development of new technology may provide a more cost-effective solution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
 
Modern European interest in high speed trains started in a relatively modest way, with the new line from 
Paris to Lyons (opened in 1981-3), a number of new stretches of high speed line in Germany and a new 
Rome- Florence route in Italy. From these isolated national beginnings, the Union International des 
Chemins de Fer developed the concept of a European Master plan covering the whole continent with 
new and upgraded high speed lines. This plan became less a pipedream and more a practical reality as 
France and Italy expanded their plans into entire networks of new lines, and new countries added their 
own proposals to the list - Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands through the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel and its associated high speed lines; Spain, through the Madrid-Seville new line and the proposals 
to link Madrid and Barcelona to each other and to the rest of the European network; Austria and 
Switzerland with their ambitious upgrading plans and finally the countries of Eastern Europe following 
the collapse of communism and the growth of East-West links. The concept emerged of a 15000km 
network of high speed routes (comprising 7000km new and 8000km upgraded infrastructure) linking all 
the major cities of Europe, and costing some 58 billion ecu (Community of European Railways, 1989). 
 
Expenditure of this magnitude requires careful appraisal. It is the aim of this paper to consider the 
relevant factors which should be taken into account in such an appraisal, and to review the evidence on 
the benefits and costs of high speed trains such as it is at the present time. First we list the relevant costs 
and benefits as we perceive them. In the next section, we consider the demand for high speed rail 
services and the extent to which they may divert traffic from other modes. We then consider the issues of 
time savings and accident savings both to rail users and to users of other modes, before turning to the 
important issue of environmental costs and benefits. Finally, we consider the issue of development 
benefits before we present our conclusions. 
 
2. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HIGH SPEED RAIL
 
In any appraisal, it is necessary to think clearly about the base case against which the proposal in 
question is to be compared. In the case of high speed rail proposals, we presume that the most likely base 
case is a continuation of conventional services over the network of routes in question, although various 
alternative levels of upgrading should also be considered. One of the great strengths of the upgrading of 
inter city public transport by means of what is essentially conventional rail technology rather than a 
totally new technology - such as maglev - is that high speed trains can operate over existing track (albeit 
at reduced speed). Thus strategically placed new or upgraded stretches of infrastructure can lead to major 
improvements in a whole network of services. (This benefit will be less readily available in Spain, 
however, inasmuch as the new high speed routes are being constructed to the standard European track 
gauge rather than the broader Spanish gauge.) The result is that a multitude of different options for 
various levels of improvement exists and needs to be considered. 
 
A further major benefit of new high speed links may be the release of capacity for other services, such as 
freight or regional passenger services. This was an important consideration both in the case of the Paris-
Lyons route and the German "Neubaustrecke". Clearly the case for high speed links is likely to be much 
stronger where there is a need for extra capacity anyway, rather than when the route is simply 
supplanting a slower one. On the other hand, since access to cities is usually via existing infrastructure, 
high speed services can take up valuable track capacity here (they may need to be planned together with 
proposals to divert suburban services into new underground routes, as in Paris). Intermediate cities not 
on the new route may also lose in terms of quality of service. Thus the extent to which new high speed 
links benefit or harm the rail network as a whole remains controversial. 
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Obviously, the first item in any appraisal is likely to be the construction cost of the high speed line, 
together with the change in operating cost to which it will lead. When this is brought together with the 
extra revenue earned by the services in question, we are in a position to undertake a financial appraisal of 
the proposal. This extra revenue will be the result of increased demand, and can be taken in the form of 
higher traffic levels, higher fares or some combination of the two. 
 
To the extent that it is not possible to devise pricing structures that capture all the benefits to users in the 
form of extra revenue, there will be some benefits to users from introduction of the new service. These 
may be quantified in terms of the reduction in generalised cost (journey time plus schedule delay plus 
fare, all valued in money terms) for existing travellers, plus the consumers surplus (evaluated on the 
usual assumption of half the benefit to existing travellers) for generated traffic. A study of a British 
upgrading proposal concluded that such benefits would amount to some 44 % of the extra revenue 
generated by the service improvement (DTp, 1984). 
 
The next benefit that is often ascribed to high speed trains is that of reducing road congestion and 
accidents; a similar consideration regarding air congestion is becoming increasingly important. Clearly 
the essential information here is the extent to which the high speed train diverts traffic from these two 
modes, together with the extent to which those modes would have been congested in the absence of high 
speed rail.    
 
This is also the key consideration in judging the environmental effects of high speed rail. Like all 
transport systems, high speed rail systems impose environmental costs of landtake, noise, visual 
intrusion and air pollution. The issue is whether they impose lower costs than other forms of transport, 
and if so, whether they divert sufficient demand from those modes to lead to a net environmental 
improvement.     
 
Local and regional development benefits are increasingly being cited as reasons for proceeding with high 
speed rail investments that are not justified on other grounds. To the extent that these are seen as 
comprising a higher overall level of economic activity, the extra incomes generated may reasonably be 
introduced into a cost-benefit analysis. Otherwise the benefit comes from the relocation of employment 
to places where it is seen by the government as being most needed. In Britain, it is common to value jobs 
created in development areas at the opportunity cost of creating a similar number of jobs by fiscal or 
other incentives. 
 
3. DEMAND FOR HIGH SPEED RAIL
 
The potential market for high speed rail may be divided broadly into business and leisure travellers. 
Business travellers are usually travelling at their company's expense, and are willing to pay highly for 
speed , comfort and convenience. Door to door travel time is the key variable in determining their choice 
of mode. Such travellers almost always have cars available, and for shorter journeys, the door to door 
convenience of the car is hard to beat. If cars on motorways can be taken to average say 100km per hour, 
then rail must be sufficiently faster to offset the extra access and waiting time involved. If this typically 
amounts to something of the order of 1 hour, then on a 200km journey, rail would need to be faster than 
200km per hour end to end to beat car; on a 300km journey, 150km per hour would suffice. Obviously, 
the higher the rail speed, the greater the catchment area for which the rail service can compete with car. 
       
This suggests that rail will be quite competitive with car for long distance journeys even without very 
high speeds. However, over longer distances it is air that is the main competitor. Given typical access 
and egress times from airports, it is rare to achieve a city centre to city centre time by air much below 3 
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hours, however short the journey. Thus the three hour journey time is often seen as an important 
watershed for rail services. However, it is important to recognise that many business trips will have one 
or other end located out of the city centre, so that some access time for the rail service must be added on 
as well. The lower the rail journey time falls below 3 hours, again, the greater the potential catchment 
area for the rail service. On the other hand, where there is no direct air service, or frequencies are poor, 
rail may compete in the business market with substantially longer journey times. 
 
The leisure market is generally much more price sensitive, with lower values of time. Nevertheless, 
improved rail speeds may lead to some substitution from the main leisure competitor - the car- as well as 
some diversion from coach amongst those with no car available. It is also in the leisure market that one 
would expect that the potential for generating totally new trips, for instance by making a day or weekend 
social or recreational trip feasible where it was not before, would be highest. 
 
How does the evidence from introduction of high speed services to date match up to these expectations? 
In Britain, the history of high speed rail services in Great Britain so far rests mainly with two trains; the 
Advanced Passenger Train and the High Speed Diesel Train (or InterCity 125).  The routes for which 
these two trains were primarily intended are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
First we have the West Coast Main Line.  Electrification of this was completed from London direct to 
Crewe, Manchester and Liverpool in 1966; the route via Birmingham was completed in the following 
year.  Trains heading north from Crewe still had to change to diesel traction at that point until 
electrification through to Glasgow opened in 1974.  None of this route would really qualify as a high 
speed route by today's standards.  Initially, electric traction was limited to a top speed of 160kmph; later 
this was raised to 180kmph for locomotives equipped with high speed pantographs.  Nevertheless, the 
combination of speed and frequency introduced with the new traction was hitherto unparalleled in Great 
Britain with 25% reductions in journey time being typical.  It was on this route, with its numerous curves 
and gradients - particularly north of Preston - that it was intended to raise speeds further by the use of the 
250kmph Advanced Passenger Train (APT), the tilting coaches of which would be permitted to run at 
higher speeds than those of conventional rolling stock, especially on curves.  Although prototype trains 
of this type made a few runs in service in 1981, they did not achieve the required degree of reliability, 
and the project was subsequently scrapped (Potter, 1987).  With the failure of this train to enter regular 
service, no major improvement in speeds has yet been achieved on this route. 
 
The history of the other group of lines shown in Figure 1 has been very different.  Operated by diesel 
traction, they saw incremental improvement until the introduction of the 200kmph high speed diesel train 
in the mid 1970's.  This is a more conventional non-tilting train, more appropriate to routes with few 
curves, or where more money has been spent on straightening them out.  It was first introduced on the 
routes from London to Bristol and Swansea in 1976, and was phased in on the East Coast Main Line 
from London to Leeds, Newcastle and Edinburgh over the period 1978-79.  The same rolling stock has 
since been introduced on other routes, although as the infrastructure was generally not improved to 
permit speeds in excess of 160kmph, the improvement in journey time resulting was much less 
significant.  Thus most of the evidence discussed here regarding high speed services in Britain relates to 
the introduction of this train. 
 
The first real opportunity to measure the change in patronage resulting from a major acceleration of 
services in practice in post-war Britain was provided by a before-and-after study of the West Coast Main 
Line electrification in 1966 (Evans, 1969).  This was based on one-day surveys of traffic conducted on 
all modes; not an entirely satisfactory approach given the large day-to-day variation in patronage, 
although it had the merit of allowing estimates to be made of whether the additional patronage had 
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changed mode or was wholly new business.  The estimated change in traffic, and the mean change in 
journey time, is illustrated for some of the major flows in Table 1.  Generally traffic rose by some 25-
50%.  It is seen that the percentage increase in traffic generally exceeded the percentage time saving.  A 
regression of the percentage change in traffic on the percentage change in journey time produced an 
elasticity of -1.3; that is to say that on average a 1% reduction in journey time had produced a 1.3% rise 
in traffic.  Examination of the other modes suggested that there had been a substantial diversion of 
business traffic from air, but little diversion of business or leisure traffic from road.  Presumably, then, 
most of the additional rail leisure traffic consisted of journeys which would not otherwise have been 
made by any mode.  A subsequent study undertaken at Leeds University which concentrated explicitly 
on the choice between rail and air suggested that if rail could achieve comparable door-to-door journey 
times to air, and at a lower price, then air would retain little traffic other than those feeding into other air 
services (Leake, 1971).  In other words, in terms of other features of service quality, rail was rated at 
least as good as air.  Given the long access and egress journeys involved in air travel for the majority of 
passengers, this suggested that particular rewards would come from reducing rail journey times below a 
threshold of around 3 hours, as was indeed achieved in the case of the stations listed in Table 1. 
 
When the time came to forecast the increase in patronage that would result from introduction of the 
diesel powered High Speed Train, it was thought prudent to assume a rather lower level of extra traffic 
than was implied by the earlier work, partly because traffic was starting from a higher base, and it 
seemed likely that the relevant elasticity would fall as traffic grew.  So it proved.  Initial monitoring work 
within BR concentrated on use of the "control flow" technique.  Under this method, no attempt was 
made to explain actual changes in patronage over time.  Rather, each route on which services had been 
improved was compared with one or more unimproved routes which displayed a similar path in traffic 
over time up to the time of improvement of the first route (Shilton, 1982).  More recently, application 
has been made of time series regression analysis in two studies at Leeds University.  The first used 
annual data on flows between all major conurbations over a 10 year period - a total of some 45 flows 
(Fowkes, Nash and Whiteing, 1985).  In a pooled time series/cross section model, year on year 
percentage changes in traffic were regressed on a variety of explanatory variables, including fares, 
average earnings and car ownership.  The effects of major service changes were estimated by use of 
dummy variables.  This procedure combines some of the features of control flow analysis with 
regression analysis.  Important variables are introduced explicitly, but any systematic unexplained 
growth in traffic will also be disallowed when estimating the effect of service variations.  The mean 
effect of the High Speed Train on traffic was found to be of the order of 15% growth in traffic over the 
course of 2 years; that of the extension of the West Coast Main Line electrification to Glasgow was 
slightly higher.  The results are summarised in Table 2. 
 
In the most recent study, time series regression has been applied to individual origin-destination pairs, 
using 4-weekly data (Owen and Phillips, 1987).  The wide range of results obtained for the effects of the 
High Speed Train is illustrated in Table 3.  The biggest effects were found at Bath and Swindon, which 
as well as enjoying the greatest improvement in service, are the closest stations in the sample to London. 
 The increase in traffic may therefore include some commuting from areas which were previously 
thought to be outside the London commuter belt.  Increases on the East Coast route to York and Leeds 
are rather lower, whilst to Plymouth (a route dominated by leisure traffic, and over which the full speed 
potential could only be used for a short distance) no significant effect could be found.  It is interesting to 
note the degree to which increases were greater in first class traffic than in second; this of course implies 
that the total increase in revenue will be considerably greater than the increases in traffic. 
 
The overall impression created by the studies of the High Speed Train was of a journey time elasticity of 
the order of -0.8.  That is, a 1% rise in speed was accompanied by a 0.8% rise in traffic.  However, there 
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was some sign (not borne out by the Plymouth example above) that traffic increased by a certain amount 
when the High Speed Train was introduced regardless of the extent of the time saving produced; 
conversely the increase in traffic was found to be less in the small number of cases where a major speed 
improvement had been introduced without new rolling stock.  This led to an alternative hypothesis that 
something like half of the increased traffic was due to the improved comfort and "image" of the new 
rolling stock, with a true journey time elasticity of around -0.4 (Shilton, 1982).  This hypothesis will be 
further discussed in the light of the "stated preference" results outlined in the next section. 
 
The higher increase in first class traffic suggests that the high speed train may have led to a greater 
increase in business than leisure travel. However, there is little evidence on the extent to which traffic 
was diverted from car or air; the study referred to above assumed a 50/50 split of diversion from road 
(mainly car) and generation (DTp, 1984). 
 
The evidence from the French TGV is more helpful here, as well as relating to a truly high speed service. 
The overall growth in rail traffic in the corridor amounted to some 75%, at a time when intercity rail 
travel elsewhere in France was stagnating. (Farber, 1990). This suggests a journey time elasticity 
considerably higher than for the British high speed train. At the same time surveys suggested that of this 
traffic some 33% had diverted from air, 18% from road and 49% was generated.(Bonnafous, 1987). This 
suggests that the high speed train is more successful in competing with air than with the car; it is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a high degree of generation of new traffic, which we would 
expect to be mainly leisure. Whilst the key origin destination pair of Paris and Lyon is well within the 3 
hour rail journey time threshold, substantial traffic increase has been experienced on much longer 
journeys such as that to Marseilles (5 hours) and Nice (7 hours). 
 
It should be noted however that rail may be more successful in taking traffic from other modes if either 
external circumstances or deliberate policies worked to encourage this (higher costs of motoring, 
increased congestion, reduced airport capacity for short distance flights etc). 
 
4. TIME AND ACCIDENT SAVINGS
 
In this section, we shall consider the benefits of high speed rail services in terms of time savings to rail 
travellers.  In the next section, we consider a wider range of issues.  In a road investment appraisal in 
Britain, time savings by travellers would be directly taken into account as a major social benefit.  
However, in Britain, main line rail improvement schemes are evaluated on purely commercial criteria.  
Thus the key question for British Rail is how far such benefits may be converted into additional revenue. 
 
Most recent British work on the value passengers place on time savings has used so-called "stated 
preference" techniques.  Starting with a study of the importance of frequency of service and the need to 
change trains undertaken by Steer and Willumsen (1981), there has been widespread use of these 
techniques for studying rail demand in recent years.  There are many variants of the approach, but what 
they have in common is a reliance on the responses of interviewees to questions as to their preferences 
between hypothetical alternatives.  By way of illustration of the technique, Table 4 shows an example 
from the study discussed in what follows.  Two alternative hypothetical combinations are presented of 
timetable, fare, journey time and reliability.  The respondents are asked to indicate their preference 
between alternatives A and B by ticking a box indicating whether they "definitely" or "probably" prefer 
A or B, or like or dislike both equally.  Because each interviewee may be given a number of these 
questions, and because the values may be carefully designed to ensure that they will reveal the 
information that is being sought, the result is that information at a high level of disaggregation can be 
obtained at very much less cost than by studying actual choices (the "revealed preference" approach). 
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A recent study sponsored by the Department of Transport with support from British Rail made extensive 
use of these methods to study what leisure travellers would be willing to pay to save travel time (MVA 
Consultancy, University of Leeds and University of Oxford, 1987).  We undertook both the part of this 
study which dealt with long distance rail leisure travel, and a parallel project financed by the Science and 
Engineering Research Council which studied business travel (Marks, Fowkes and Nash, 1986).  The 
results of these two projects will now be discussed. 
 
In the study of leisure travel, passengers were interviewed on trains between London and Manchester, 
Birmingham and Manchester and Bristol and London.  The resulting data was used to calibrate a discrete 
choice model from which the value passengers placed on savings in travel time could be estimated.  As 
expected, there was a strong - though less than proportional - relationship between values of time savings 
and income, with the upper income group having a value twice that of the lowest.  There was also some 
variation according to exact journey purpose, with an overall average of 5.9p per minute in 1985 prices.  
Results are given in Table 5. 
 
For business travellers, the issues are more complicated.  Typically, business travellers choose 
themselves between the alternative modes their employers will permit them to use.  Since their 
employers pay the costs, one might expect them always to use the highest quality mode permitted, 
although this does not actually appear to be the case.  Ultimately, then, what a business traveller is 
willing to pay to save time is the product of what the employer is willing to pay for as well as what 
choice the employee makes.  Other relevant considerations, are that long distance rail journeys typically 
start and end outside the normal working day, so that time savings are often converted into leisure time 
rather than devoted to additional work, and that time spent on the train can be usefully employed, for 
work or for eating a meal.  These factors might lead to an expectation that the value employers place 
upon saving time for their workforce might be somewhat below the conventional British Department of 
Transport assumption that this equates to the wage rate plus a markup for the overhead costs of 
employing labour. 
 
We thus undertook studies of the preferences of both a sample of employers regarding overall travel 
policy, and a sample of employees with respect to specific long distance journeys.  In the stated 
preference exercise with the latter, it was made clear that the employee would be given a fixed expenses 
budget, and would be entitled to keep any unspent surplus.  Thus the employees' willingness to pay 
represents a willingness to pay out of their own pocket.  By contrast, the employer's willingness to pay 
represents a willingness to pay out of the funds of the organisation in question.  Table 6 shows the two 
values, together with the results of applying the standard method of valuing business travel time used by 
the British Department of Transport.  In a situation where some of any time savings would be devoted to 
leisure and some to work, we would expect the appropriate valuation of travel time savings to lie 
somewhere between the employers' and the employees' valuation.  Thus the standard Department of 
Transport assumption appears to lead to a reasonable estimate of what might be a typical valuation in 
practice, although one might of course still doubt whether such a high value - representing in part at least 
a benefit in terms of extra leisure time to a particularly well-paid sector of the community - should be 
taken as an appropriate valuation from the point of view of society as a whole. 
 
In summary, then, the best evidence we have suggests values of travel time savings of the order of 6p per 
minute for leisure travellers and 16p per minute for business.  If this is true, then there are very large 
benefits to users from introduction of high speed trains.  For instance, on the East Coast Main Line, a 
route carrying some 10 million passengers per year at the time of introduction of the high speed train 
with around 25% travelling on business, a 30 minute time saving per journey (probably an 
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underestimate) would lead to an annual benefit of some £25m. 
 
We may also use these values of travel time savings as the basis for a further estimate of the travel time 
elasticity of demand for rail travel.  We approach this question by asking what increase in traffic the time 
saving would lead to if fares remained unchanged.  We already have (from the time series regressions 
referred to earlier) a fairly precise and robust estimate of the sensitivity of traffic levels to fares as being 
an elasticity of the order of -1.0.  If we assume that the leisure travel elasticity is around -1.25, with a 
somewhat lower elasticity of, say, -0.5 for business travel, we may estimate the corresponding journey 
time elasticities from a knowledge of the value of time savings and of fares and journey times.  
Obviously the latter will vary from route to route, and according to the type of ticket bought.  In 1985, 
British Rail Inter City receipts averaged about 4.3p per km, but with variations from 10p per km for first 
class travel on prime business routes to bargain fares as low as 2.5p.  Suppose that we assume that on 
average business travellers pay 50% more than leisure and that business travel accounts for 25% of 
travel.  A reasonable mean speed assuming adjustment time to assume would be around 16 km per 
minute.  This would lead to typical journey time elasticities in the leisure market of the order of -0.8, 
whilst for business travel a typical value would be around - 0.6.  These results would suggest an average 
journey time elasticity very close to the value of -0.8 given by the High Speed Train monitoring studies, 
lending support to the view that the extra traffic was produced largely by the journey time reductions, 
with only a modest effect of other quality of service variables. 
 
Assuming this sort of level of generated traffic (which accords with the evidence quoted earlier) there is 
little doubt that the introduction of the high speed train on the East Coast Main Line was financially very 
profitable for BR.  The total cost of 28 high speed sets was some £50m in 1978 prices, but since it 
released modern air conditioned stock for service elsewhere it avoided a similar expenditure on 
conventional rolling stock.  Only some £15m (1978 prices) was spent on upgrading track and signalling 
(Table 7).  Estimates by one of our students suggest on an incremental cost and revenue basis an internal 
rate of return of 19-22%, rising to 56-61% when time savings to users are added in (Mafurirano, 1983), 
in comparison with continuing to run the existing service. 
 
In the absence of major new road capacity, a further obvious benefit of high speed rail is relief of 
congestion.  Britain is already facing acute and worsening congestion, not just in cities, but also on some 
interurban motorways and trunk roads.  The same study as referred to in the previous paragraph 
examined the degree to which removing traffic from various categories of road would yield benefits in 
terms of reduced travel time and accidents for remaining road users.  The figures for reduced congestion, 
uprated both for inflation and for revisions in the real values of time, are shown in Table 8.  Both 
congestion and accident benefits were very significant relative to the extra revenue generated by faster 
speeds even in the 1984 study although this was partly offset when the loss of revenue to the exchequer 
from a reduction in taxed road transport in favour of untaxed rail was taken into account. 
 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
 
The direct environmental effects of high speed rail services comprise the effects of construction of the 
infrastructure (landtake, severance, visual intrusion) and the effects of the operation (noise, air pollution). 
Regarding the former, it is well recognised that rail infrastructure requires less landtake than motorways 
devoted to cars. However, the question again must be raised of how far one is a substitute for the other. 
The comparison is also less favourable to rail if we are comparing a new rail route with additional lanes 
on an existing motorway, although it must be recognised that new railways may follow the course of 
existing railways or motorways, subject to the constraints imposed by curvature and gradient 
requirements for high speed. (Steer, Davies and Gleave, 1989). If a new transport corridor is required, it 
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will be important how densely populated the area is and whether the topography makes it easy to fit in 
the new infrastructure. 
 
Regarding noise, the above study concluded that a high speed rail route and a new motorway would 
create approximately the same level of noise measured in terms of Equivalent Continuous Sound Level. 
However, there is evidence that the more intermittent nature of rail noise is less disturbing than 
motorway noise (Fields and Walker, 1982). Again, however, comparison of a new high speed rail route 
with adding lanes to an existing motorway would show rail as creating additional noise nuisance unless it 
can be located in an existing noisy transport corridor or conversely well away from centres of 
population. 
 
Less effort seems to have been devoted to comparing the environmental effects of rail and air. It is 
obviously in the vicinity of the airport that air creates its major landtake and noise disbenefits. By 
postponing the need to develop new or expanded airports, high speed rail could have a very real benefit 
here.  
 
On air pollution there are two issues, a local one and a global one, but for inter city travel it may 
reasonably be presumed that it is the global one (emissions which contribute to acid rail and the 
greenhouse effect) that is predominant. For oil based transport modes, it is reasonable simply to compare 
primary energy use by mode (Table 9). This suggests that if car and air were to be replaced by a high 
speed train, the reduction in energy consumption would be substantial. Even if 50% of the traffic carried 
by a high speed rail service were generated, a high speed rail link which diverted the remaining 50% of 
traffic from air and car would save energy.    However, in looking at speeding up an existing rail service, 
one would have to take account of the fact that rail energy consumption begins to rise rapidly with speed, 
so that the energy consumption for existing rail travellers will be much higher than otherwise. 
  
A further major problem is that high speeds almost invariably involve electric traction, and much then 
depends on how the electricity is generated. In a country with plentiful nuclear or hydro electricity, the 
emissions consequences of high speed rail may be very slight (although there remain other, perhaps more 
significant environmental objections to nuclear power). In Britain, with its current dependence on coal 
fired power stations, the emissions consequences are more serious, although it has been estimated that 
there superior running efficiency means that electric express trains produce a similar amount of 
greenhouse gases to diesel per passenger km. (Hughes, 1990). 
 
Overall, then, the simplistic environmental case for high speed rail does not look very firm, and there 
may well be circumstances in which the introduction of high speed rail will have net environmental 
disbenefits. In practice, much depends on the extent to which it can really delay the need for additional 
airport or motorway capacity, whether it can readily be fitted in to an existing transport corridor or an 
area which is not seen as environmentally sensitive, and the source of the energy for traction. Certainly 
environmental as well as cost considerations point to the need to emphasise a choice of speed which is 
fast enough to be competitive rather than the fastest that is technically possible. 
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6. DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS
 
Within Britain, the argument that new road infrastructure should be constructed for local or regional 
economic development benefits has long been viewed with suspicion. Most studies have concluded that 
new road infrastructure achieves little other than a limited amount of relocation usually at a local level 
(Parkinson, 1981). 
 
On the face of it high speed rail infrastructure appears less likely to have an impact than new roads. Even 
with the improved service, rail will be used for a much smaller proportion of business trips than road, 
and high speed rail is of limited benefit to freight. Yet much of the argument for extension of the French 
TGV to extra regions, and for the development of high speed links between the Channel Tunnel and the 
north of Britain has rested on supposed regional development benefits. 
 
Again, the best evidence on the effects of the high speed train relates to the Paris-Lyon TGV. Bonnafous 
(1987) undertook surveys both of business travellers and of a large sample of enterprises in the Rhone-
Alps region. As expected, he found the effect  of the high speed train on industrial location to be very 
marginal. More significant were the effects on tourism and service industries. Although there was a big 
increase in day trips to tourist attractions, there was no evidence that the high speed train benefitted the 
winter sports business, and hotel stays in big cities were reduced as day trips became more easy. On the 
other hand, Lyons based service industries such as market research, advertising and consultancy did 
greatly expand their number of clients in the Paris area, with no evidence of a similar invasion of the 
much smaller Lyons market by Paris based firms. 
 
Thus there is some evidence of regional development benefits to the service sector, but it remains 
doubtful whether this should be a major consideration when considering investment in high speed trains. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS
 
There is still too little evidence of the effects of high speed trains to be very certain about their costs and 
benefits, particularly given the degree to which their effects vary according to circumstances. However, 
the following conclusions appear appropriate from the evidence to date. 
 
Firstly, increases in rail speeds can generate substantial increases in traffic and revenue, particularly for 
journeys in the middle distance range. This extra traffic will be part generated and part diverted from air 
or car. Rail appears to be particularly competitive with air where it achieves comparable door to  door 
journey times. 
 
Secondly, higher speeds will bring benefits to users which cannot all be captured in the form of extra 
revenue. It may also bring limited benefits in the form of time and accident cost savings on other modes 
of transport. However, the main benefit of removing traffic from other modes will be a reduced need for 
expensive and environmentally intrusive new infrastructure on those modes.  
 
Thirdly, neither the environmental nor the development benefits of high speed rail appear particularly 
convincing. On the environmental issue, much depends on the exact circumstances; the net effects of 
high speed rail could be beneficial or damaging. Regarding regional development, there is some 
evidence of benefits to the service industries. 
 
Fourthly, and most importantly, there is a need for careful appraisal of all high speed rail proposals, and 
a traditional transport cost benefit analysis appears well equipped to capture the most important effects. 
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Appraisal is particularly important given the enormous range of possibilities regarding design speeds and 
mixture of upgrading and new construction. 
 
It appears likely that a core network of high speed routes serving the major European middle distance 
markets, on routes where extra capacity is needed anyway and where airport capacity is at a premium, 
will be well justified. But proposals to build entirely new infrastructure to more peripheral areas where 
extra capacity is not needed anyway should be looked at with much greater scepticism. In these areas, 
upgrading of existing lines and the exploitation of new technology such as the Italian or Swedish tilting 
trains, which can travel at higher speeds over existing infrastructure, is likely to be a more cost-effective 
solution. 
 
  
 
 
 11 
REFERENCES
 
A. Bonnafous (1987):  The Regional Impact of the TGV (Transportation, 14, pp.127-137) 
 
Community of European Railways (1989):  Proposals for a European High Speed Network 
 
Department of Transport (1984):  Economic Evaluation Comparability Study - Final Report 
 
Earth Resources Research (1989):  Atmospheric Emissions from the Use of Transport in the UK (1989). 
 
A.W. Evans (1969):  Inter City Travel and the London Midland Electrification.  Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, Vol III, 69-95. 
 
K. Farber (1990):  The European High Speed Train Project (Conference on high speed trains, 
entrepreneurship and society, Stockholm School of Economics) 
 
J.M. Fields and J.G. Walker (1989):  The Response to Railway Noise in Residential Areas of Great 
Britain.  Journal of Sound and Vibration, 85, 177-255 
 
A.S. Fowkes, C.A. Nash and A.E. Whiteing (1985):  Understanding Trends in Inter-City Rail Traffic in 
Great Britain.  Transportation Planning and Technology.  Vol 10, 65-80. 
 
P. Hughes (1990):  Transport and Pollution.  What's the Damage?  (Local Transport Today Conference 
on Environmental Policy in Local Transport) 
 
G.R. Leake (1971):  Inter City Modal Split in Great Britain - Air versus Rail.  Centre for Transport 
Studies, University of Leeds. 
 
D. Mafurirano (1983):  A Comparison of Cost-Benefit and Financial Rates of Return of an Inter City 
Rail Improvement Project (unpublished MSc Dissertation, University of Leeds). 
 
P. Marks, A.S. Fowkes and C.A. Nash (1986):  Valuing Long Distance Business Travel Time Savings 
for Evaluation:  A Methodological Review and Application.  Planning and Transportation Research and 
Computation Summer Annual Meeting. 
 
MVA Consultancy; Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds; Transport Studies Unit, 
University of Oxford (1987):  The Value of Travel Time Savings, Policy Journals. 
 
A.D. Owen and G.D.A. Phillips (1987):  The Characteristics of Railway Passenger Demand:  An 
Econometric Investigation.  Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.  Vol XXI, 231-253. 
 
M. Parkinson (1981):  The Effect of Road Investment on Economic Development in the UK 
(Department of Transport, Government Economic Service, Working Paper No 43). 
 
S. Potter (1987):  On the Right Lines?  The Limits of Technological Innovation (Frances Pinter, 
London). 
 
D. Shilton (1982):  Modelling the Demand for High Speed Train Services.  Journal of the Operational 
Research Society.  Vol 33, 713-722.  
  
 
 
 12 
 
J.K. Steer and L. Willumsen (1981):  An Investigation of Passenger Preference Structures.  Planning and 
Transportation Research and Computation Summer Annual Meeting. 
 
Steer Davies and Gleave (1989):  The Right Tracks to Europe (Transport 2000) 
  
 
 
 13 
 
 
 TABLE 1 
 
 EFFECT OF ELECTRIFICATION 
 OF WEST COAST MAIN LINE 
 
 MAJOR FLOWS
 
 
 
        % CHANGE 
     % CHANGE  IN 
     IN   JOURNEY 
BETWEEN LONDON AND  TRAFFIC  TIME
 
 
 
MANCHESTER     +27     -26 
 
LIVERPOOL      +58     -24 
 
PRESTON      +46     -16 
 
CREWE      +35     -34 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  EVANS (1969) 
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 TABLE 2 
 
 % INCREASE IN TRAFFIC 
 DUE TO IMPROVED SERVICES 
 POOLED TIME SERIES/CROSS 
 SECTION REGRESSION 
 
 MEAN OF ALL RELEVANT 
 INTER-CONURBATION FLOWS
 
 
 
         CREWE- 
      HIGH   GLASGOW 
      SPEED  ELECTRI- 
      TRAIN  FICATION
 
 
FIRST YEAR EFFECT   +11%     +16% 
 
SECOND YEAR EFFECT    +4%      +2% 
 
TOTAL EFFECT    +15%     +18% 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  FOWKES, NASH AND WHITEING (1985) 
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 TABLE 3 
 
 % INCREASE IN TRAFFIC DUE TO 
 HIGH SPEED TRAIN ON SELECTED 
 ROUTES TO/FROM LONDON 
 
 TIME SERIES REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
 
     FIRST STANDARD 
     CLASS CLASS TOTAL
 
 
BATH        84     43     54 
 
SWINDON      112     30     42 
 
CARDIFF       57     27     34 
 
BRISTOL       55     26     28 
 
YORK        22     17     23 
 
LEEDS       28     15     19 
 
PLYMOUTH        0      0      0 
 
MEDIAN OF 12 FLOWS     32     16     23 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  OWEN AND PHILLIPS (1987) 
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 TABLE 4 
 
 
       A
 
LONDON, dep.   250 320 350 420 450 
Stockport...    510 540 610 640 710 
Manchester, arr.   520 550 620 650 720 
 
     Fares:  One way £12, Return £24 
     Scheduled Journey Time: 2hrs 30mins 
     Up to 10mins late 
 
        B
 
LONDON, dep.   250 . 350 . 450 
Stockport...    540 . 640 . 750 
Manchester, arr.   550 . 650 . 750 
 
     Fares: One way £10, Return £20 
     Schedule Journey Time: 3hrs 
     Up to 30mins late 
 
 
Definitely Probably Like A and Probably Definitely 
Prefer A Prefer A B Equally Prefer B Prefer B 
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 TABLE 5 
 
 VALUES OF LONG DISTANCE 
 LEISURE TIME SAVINGS 
 STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUE
 
 
 
VISITING FRIENDS AND RELATIVES   6.6 
 
HOLIDAY       4.8 
 
RETURNING HOME     4.6 
 
OTHER       6.6 
 
OVERALL       5.9 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  MARKS (1985) 
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 TABLE 6 
 
 VALUES OF LONG DISTANCE 
 BUSINESS TIME SAVINGS
 
 
 
EMPLOYEE'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY   12.0p/MINUTE 
 
CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT 
ASSUMPTIONS      16.0p/MINUTE 
 
 
EMPLOYER'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY   23.0p/MINUTE 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  MARKS, FOWKES AND NASH (1986) 
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 TABLE 7 
 
 ECML HIGH SPEED 
 DIESEL SERVICES
 
 CAPITAL COSTS (1978 PRICES)
 
 
 
 
ROLLING STOCK    £50 
 
TRACK AND SIGNALLING   £15 
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 TABLE 8 
 
 BENEFITS FROM REMOVING 
 ROAD TRAFFIC 
 (JULY 1988p PER PCU REMOVED) 
 
 
 
         CAPACITY UTILISATION
       70  90  100
 
RURAL
 
MOTORWAY       2.4   3.0   4.7 
DUAL CARRIAGEWAY     1.8   2.4   3.0 
SINGLE CARRIAGEWAY (10m)    2.4   3.3   4.7 
SINGLE CARRIAGEWAY (7m)    2.4   3.0   3.5 
 
URBAN
 
SUBURBAN DUAL CARRIAGEWAY   4.7   7.7  10.0 
SUBURBAN SINGLE CARRIAGEWAY   7.7  13.0  17.1 
URBAN NON-CENTRAL     9.4  15.9  21.2 
URBAN CENTRAL     18.3  34.8  49.0 
 
 
 
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT (1984) ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
  COMPARABILITY STUDY, UPDATED TO JULY 1988 OPERATING 
  COSTS AND VALUES OF TIME 
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 TABLE 9 
 
 PETROLEUM USE BY TRANSPORT MODE 
 (LITRES PER HUNDRED PASSENGER KM)
 
 
 
     CURRENT
     LOAD   FULLY
     FACTORS  LOADED
 
COMMUTING CAR   9.2   3.0 
 
AIRCRAFT    9.0   5.8 
 
OFF-PEAK CAR   4.2   2.4 
 
HIGH SPEED TRAIN*  2.0   1.0 
 
EXPRESS COACH   0.9   0.7 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE:  EARTH RESOURCES RESEARCH:  ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS FROM THE USE OF 
TRANSPORT IN THE UK (1989) 
 
*Modern rolling stock can achieve this level of energy consumption at 300 km ph (Community of 
European Railways, 1989) 
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 TABLE 10 
 
 CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL 
 LINK PROPOSALS 
 
 
 
     MAXIMUM SPEED JOURNEY TIME (mins) 
     (kmph)  (London to Channel Tunnel) 
 
 
EXISTING ROUTE      150    70 
 
ROUTE 2 TO WATERLOO     220    48 
 
ROUTE 2 TO KINGS CROSS    220    47 
 
 
 
SOURCE: BR (1988) CHANNEL TUNNEL TRAIN SERVICES.  BR STUDY 
  REPORT ON LONG-TERM ROUTE AND TERMINAL CAPACITY 
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